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Since the negative result of Lo (Physical Review A, 1997), it has been left open whether there
exist some functions that can be securely computed in two-party setting in quantum domain when
one of the parties is malicious. In this paper, we for the first time, show that there are some
functions for which secure two-party quantum computation is indeed possible for non-simultaneous
channel model. This is in sharp contrast with the impossibility result of Ben -Or et al. (FOCS,
2006) in broadcast channel model. The functions we study are of two types - one is any function
without an embedded XOR, and the other one is a particular function containing an embedded XOR.
Contrary to classical solutions, security against adversaries with unbounded power of computation
is achieved by the quantum protocols due to entanglement. Further, in the context of secure multi-
party quantum computation, for the first time we introduce rational parties, each of whom tries to
maximize its utility by obtaining the function output alone. We adapt our quantum protocols for
both the above types of functions in rational setting to achieve fairness and strict Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a secure two-party computation, two parties or play-
ers want to compute a particular function of their inputs
keeping the inputs secret from each other. They are only
allowed to obtain the output of the function preserving
some security notions under certain adversarial model.
The secure two-party computation is a special case
of ‘Secure Multi-party Computation’ (SMC). In classical
domain, the SMC problem has been studied extensively.
The security of classical SMC comes from some compu-
tational hardness assumptions and thus is conditional.
On the other hand, in quantum domain the adversary is
always assumed to have unbounded power of computa-
tion and the security of a protocol comes from the laws
of physics. This is why many researchers have tried to
exploit the quantum mechanical effect [1] to solve the
problems of SMC [2–9].
In [7], it is pointed out that there are some functions
which can not be securely evaluated in quantum domain
for two-sided [10] two party setting. Later, Ben -Or et
al. [11] generalized it by showing an impossibility result
for n players, when there are n2 or more faulty players.
Since the work of [7] in 1997, in case of two-party quan-
tum computation, some additional assumptions, such as
the semi-honest third party etc., have been introduced to
obtain the secure private comparison [2, 8, 12].
Yao’s millionaires’ problem [13] is one of the examples
of the secure two-party computation. Yao’s millionaires’
problem [13], or more precisely, the ‘greater than’ func-
tion deals with two millionaires, Alice and Bob, who are
interested in finding who amongst them is richer, with-
out revealing their actual wealth to each other. Much
effort has been given to solve this problem in quantum
domain [3–5, 8, 9], all of which analyzed the security
issues against several eavesdropping strategies. Jia et
al. [3] dealt the problem with semi-honest party. In [4],
the millionaires’ problem is studied considering continu-
ous variable. He [5] exploited the idea of quantum key
distribution to solve the problem. Tseng et al. [8] pro-
posed the use of Bell state to solve this problem. Their
protocol also exploits a third party to assist the players.
Yang et al. [9] showed the vulnerability of their proto-
col if the third party is disloyal. However, none of these
works [2–6, 8, 9, 12] analyze the security issues consider-
ing malicious players.
In classical domain the subsequent work by Gordon et
al. [14, 15] showed that any function over polynomial-size
domains which does not contain an “embedded XOR”
can be converted into the greater than function or more
specifically into the millionaires’ problem. Hence, mil-
lionaires’ problem covers all functions without embedded
XOR. Gordon et al. also studied a function which has an
embedded XOR [14, 15], namely, a function that simply
checks whether the inputs chosen by two players (from a
specified domain) are equal or not. Exploiting the idea of
Gordon et al., we for the first time design two quantum
protocols for these two distinct sets of functions and ana-
lyze the security issues when players are malicious unlike
the existing quantum protocols [2–6, 8, 9, 12].
Further, we analyze our new quantum protocols con-
sidering rational players and this is the first work on se-
cure multi-party quantum computation in rational set-
ting. Rational players are neither ‘good’ nor ‘malicious’,
they are utility maximizing. Each rational party wishes
to learn the output while allowing as few others as possi-
ble to learn the output. Thus, each rational party chooses
to abort to maximize its utility. This rationality concept
comes from game theory. Recently, significant effort has
been given towards bridging the gap between two ap-
2parently unrelated domains, namely, cryptography and
game theory [16–18]. Cryptography deals with the worst
case scenario, making the protocols secure against mali-
cious behaviour of a party. However, in game theoretic
perspective, a protocol is designed against the rational
deviation of a party. Very recently, Brunner and Lin-
den [19] showed a deep link between quantum physics
and game theory. By bringing quantum mechanics into
a class of games, known as Bayesian games, they showed
that players who can use quantum resources, such as en-
tangled quantum particles, can outperform classical play-
ers. In quantum domain, the concept of rational players
in secret sharing has been first introduced in [20]. In this
paper, we identify that fairness in secure two-party com-
putation in non-rational setting does not imply fairness
in rational setting. In rational setting, we modify the
protocols to achieve both fairness as well as strict Nash
equilibrium [17, 20].
A. Contributions
Below we summarize our contributions in this work.
1. For the first time in quantum domain, we identify
that for non-simultaneous channel model, there ex-
ist some functions which can be computed in two-
party setting with complete fairness when one of
the parties acts maliciously. We consider two sets
of functions. One set consists of the functions with-
out embedded XOR, whereas the other set deals
with a specific function having an embedded XOR.
2. We also consider rational adversaries and modify
our protocols accordingly to achieve both fairness
and strict Nash equilibrium. To our knowledge,
ours is the first work on secure multi-party quan-
tum computation in the rational setting.
3. Our protocols are secure against both Byzantine as
well as Fail-stop adversaries in both non-rational
and rational settings.
B. Key Differences from Prior Works
Here we highlight the key differences of our protocols
from the existing quantum protocols for secure two and
multi-party computation.
1. Lo [7] showed that, there are certain functions for
which two-sided secure two-party quantum com-
putation is impossible if one of them is malicious.
Ben -Or et al. [11] proved that assuming pairwise
quantum channels and classical broadcast channels
among the n players, a universally composable, sta-
tistically secure multi-party quantum computation
is possible for less than n2 faulty players. On the
other hand, we identify that in non-simultaneous
channel model, both the millionaires’ and the em-
bedded XOR problem can be solved in quantum
domain with complete fairness when one of the par-
ties is malicious.
2. Our protocols differ from the existing quantum pro-
tocols for private comparison [2–6, 8, 9, 12] in the
sense that all these protocols analyze the secu-
rity issues against several eavesdropping strategies.
None of those consider malicious players. Contrary
to this, we analyze the security of our protocols
considering malicious behaviour of the players. In
our protocols there are no external adversary.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we explain what is meant by functional-
ity, two-party computation, ideal and real world model,
security of a protocol, Byzantine and fail-stop adversary
used in this work. We also define fairness in non-rational
as well as rational settings. We identify that when we
move from one model to another, the definition of fair-
ness changes. Further, we define strict Nash equilibrium
for two players game in the rational setting.
A. Functionality
In classical domain and in two-party setting, a func-
tionality F = {fλ}λ∈N is a sequence of randomized pro-
cesses, where λ is the security parameter and fλ maps
pairs of inputs to pairs of outputs (one for each party).
Explicitly, we can write fλ = (f
1
λ, f
2
λ), where f
1
λ (resp.
f2λ) represents the output of the first party, say P1 (resp.
output of the second party, say P2). The domain of fλ
is Xλ × Yλ, where Xλ (resp. Yλ) denotes the possible
inputs of the first (resp. second) party. If the domain
sizes |Xλ| and |Yλ| are polynomial in λ, then we say that
F is defined over polynomial size domains. If each fλ is
deterministic we say that each fλ as well as the collection
F is a function.
B. Two-Party Computation
In classical domain, the two-party computation of a
functionality F = {f1λ, f
2
λ} is defined as follows. If a
party P1 is holding 1
λ and a input x ∈ Xλ and a party
P2 is holding 1
λ and a input y ∈ Yλ, then the joint distri-
bution of the outputs of the parties is statistically close
to (f1λ(x, y), f
2
λ(x, y)).
C. Ideal vs. Real World model
In ideal world model we assume that there is an incor-
ruptible trusted third party who computes the function
3in behaves of P1 and P2. P1 and P2 send their inputs
to the TTP who computes the functionality and returns
the value to each party. On the other hand, in real world
model there is no trusted party to compute the func-
tionality, rather a protocol is executed to compute the
functionality.
Here, along the same line as [14, 15], we assume a
hybrid world model, where there is a trusted third party
who computes the function like in the ideal world and dis-
tributes the shares of the function’s output like a dealer
in secret sharing [21] between the players. The players
construct the output by exchanging their shares. In our
hybrid world model we call the TTP as a dealer.
The security of a protocol depends upon what an ad-
versary can do during the real protocol execution. In
ideal world, as there is an incorruptible trusted third
party who computes the function and sends the output to
the participants the computation is secure by definition.
However, in real world model there is no trusted party.
If the adversary who exists in the real model can do no
more harm than the ideal scenario, then we say that the
protocol is secure.
D. Fail-stop and Byzantine Adversarial Model
In the fail-stop setting, each party follows the proto-
col as directed except that it may choose to abort at
any time [18] and a party is assumed not to change its
input when running the protocol. On the other hand,
in Byzantine setting, a deviating party may behave arbi-
trarily. It may change the inputs or may choose to abort.
Since Byzantine adversary covers all the characteristics
of a fail-stop adversary, it is very natural to consider
only Byzantine setting. If a protocol is secure against a
Byzantine adversary, it must be secure against a fail-stop
adversary. Hence, throughout the paper we analyze the
security issues against Byzantine adversary only.
E. Security in Non-rational Setting
In non-rational setting, the move of a player is de-
cided by his adversarial nature not by his utility func-
tion; whereas in rational setting every move of a player
is guided by his utility.
1. Fairness
For fairness in non-rational setting, we need to intro-
duce some terminologies. Let us assume that P1 begins
by holding an input x ∈ X and P2 begins by holding an
input y ∈ Y , and z ∈ {0, 1}∗ is the auxiliary input of the
adversary. Let {IDEALF ,S(z)(x, y)}(x,y)∈X×Y,z∈{0,1}∗
represent a pair of two random variables denoted by
V IEW and OUT , where V IEWideal(x, y) represents the
output of the party who is corrupted by the adversary S
and OUTideal(x, y) represents the output of the honest
party in the ideal world. Thus, we can write
{IDEALF ,S(z)(x, y)}(x,y)∈X×Y,z∈{0,1}∗
= (V IEWideal(x, y), OUTideal(x, y)).
Similarly, let {REALΠ,A(z)(x, y)}(x,y)∈X×Y,z∈{0,1}∗
represents a pair of two random variables,
namely V IEWreal(x, y) and OUTreal(x, y), where
V IEWreal(x, y) denotes the random variable in real
world consisting of the view of the player corrupted
by the adversary A and OUTreal(x, y) represents the
random variable consisting of the output of the honest
party in the real world [22].
Definition 1. (Fairness) A protocol Π is said to securely
compute a functionality F with complete fairness if for
every adversary A, having unbounded power of computa-
tion in the real model, there exits an adversary, S, with
same computational complexity in the ideal model such
that
{IDEALF ,S(z)(x, y)}(x,y)∈X×Y,z∈{0,1}∗
≡ {REALΠ,A(z)(x, y)}(x,y)∈X×Y,z∈{0,1}∗.
Note that, here we do not require a security parameter
λ as we consider our adversary has unbounded power of
computation.
In our hybrid model, the fairness condition is as fol-
lows.
Definition 2. (Fairness) A protocol Π is said to securely
compute a functionality F with complete fairness if for
every adversary A, having unbounded power of compu-
tation in the hybrid model, there exits an adversary, S,
with same computational complexity in the ideal model
such that
{IDEALF ,S(z)(x, y)}(x,y)∈X×Y,z∈{0,1}∗
≡ {HYBRIDΠ,A(z)(x, y)}(x,y)∈X×Y,z∈{0,1}∗.
here, REAL is replaced by HYBRID which is the
random variable consisting of the view (V IEW ) of the
adversary and the output (OUT ) of the honest party in
the hybrid world in the same manner as above.
F. Rational Setting and its Security
We define a function reconstruction protocol with ratio-
nal players to be a pair (Γ,−→σ ), where Γ is the game (i.e.,
specification of allowable actions) and −→σ =(σ1, . . . , σn)
denotes the strategies followed by n number of players.
We use the notations −→σ −w and (σ′w ,
−→σ −w) respectively
for (σ1, . . . , σw−1, σw+1, . . . , σn) and (σ1, . . . , σw−1, σ′w,
σw+1, . . . , σn). The outcome of the game is denoted by
−→o (Γ,−→σ )=(o1, . . . , on). The set of possible outcomes with
respect to a party Pw is as follows. 1) Pw correctly com-
putes f , while others do not; 2) everybody correctly com-
putes f ; 3) nobody computes f ; 4) others computes f
correctly, while Pw does not.
4The output that no function is computed is denoted
by ⊥ (i.e., null as in [14]).
1. Utilities and Preferences
The utility function uw of each party Pw is defined over
the set of possible outcomes of the game. The outcomes
and corresponding utilities for two parties are described
in Table I. We here assume that the utility values are
real.
TABLE I: Outcomes and Utilities for (2, 2) rational function
reconstruction
P1’s outcome P2’s outcome P1’s Utility P2’s Utility
(o1) (o2) U1(o1, o2) U2(o1, o2)
o1=f o2=f U
TT
1 U
TT
2
o1=⊥ o2=⊥ U
NN
1 U
NN
2
o1=f o2=⊥ U
TN
1 U
NT
2
o1=⊥ o2=f U
NT
1 U
TN
2
Players have their preferences based on different possi-
ble outcomes. In this work, a rational playerw is assumed
to have the following preference:
R1 : U
TN
w > U
TT
w > U
NN
w > U
NT
w .
2. Fairness
In non-rational setting, the security of a protocol is
analyzed by comparing what an adversary can do in a
real protocol execution to what it can do in an ideal sce-
nario that is secure by definition [14, 15, 22]. This is
formalized by considering an ideal computation involv-
ing an incorruptible trusted party to whom the parties
send their inputs. The trusted party computes the func-
tionality on the inputs and returns to each party its re-
spective output. Loosely speaking, a protocol is secure
if any adversary interacting in the real protocol (where
no trusted party exists) can do no more harm than if it
were involved in the above-described ideal computation.
A rational player, being selfish, desires an unfair out-
come, i.e., computing the function alone. Therefore, the
basic aim of rational computation has been to achieve
fairness. According to Von Neumann and Morgenstern
expected utility theorem [23], under natural assumptions,
the individual would prefer one prospect O1 over another
prospect O2 if and only if E[U(O1) ≥ E[U(O2)]. The
work [24] implicitly uses the expected utility theorem to
derive its results. We also use the same approach and
accordingly redefine fairness as follows.
Definition 3. (Fairness) A rational function reconstruc-
tion mechanism (Γ,−→σ ) is said to be completely fair if for
a party Pw, (w ∈ {1, 2}), who is corrupted by an adver-
sary having unbounded power of computation, the follow-
ing holds:
UTTw ≥ E[Uw(Ol)],
where Ol = {o
1
w, . . . , o
n′
w ; p1, . . . , pn′} is any prospect
when the player deviates from the suggested strategy and
n′ is the number of possible outcomes.
3. Strict Nash Equilibrium
Now, we define Nash equilibrium for two players game.
A suggested strategy −→σ of a mechanism (Γ,−→σ ) is said to
be in Nash equilibrium when there is no incentive for
a player Pw, w ∈ {1, 2} to deviate from the suggested
strategy, given that other player is following its suggested
strategy. There are many variants of Nash equilibrium
in game theory literature [17]. However, in the quan-
tum domain, the players are assumed to have unbounded
computational power and hence the relevant equilibrium
is the strict Nash equilibrium [17, 20]. We recall its defi-
nition below.
Definition 4. (Strict Nash equilibrium) The suggested
strategy −→σ in the mechanism (Γ,−→σ ) is a strict Nash equi-
librium, if for every player Pw, w ∈ {1, 2}, who possesses
unbounded power of computation and for any strategy σ′w
which deviates from the suggested strategy −→σ , we have
uw(σ
′
w ,
−→σ −w) < uw(−→σ ).
III. REVISITING THE MILLIONAIRES’
PROBLEM [14]
In this section, we first describe the millionaires’ prob-
lem or more precisely, the greater than function, pro-
posed by Gordon et al. [14, 15]. Let us denote two play-
ers by P1 and P2. As we deal with hybrid model, there is
a trusted party whom we call dealer. Suppose P1 has the
secret i and P2 has the secret j, 1 ≤ i ≤M , 1 ≤ j ≤M ,
where M is an integer. The dealer gives an ordered list
X = {x1, x2, . . . , xM} to P1 and another ordered list
Y = {y1, y2, . . . , yM} to P2. Then P1 sends xi to the
dealer and P2 sends yj to the dealer. Let f be a deter-
ministic function which maps X × Y → {0, 1} × {0, 1}.
The function f(xi, yj) can be defined as a pair of outputs,
i.e., f(xi, yj) = (f1(xi, yj), f2(xi, yj)), where f1(xi, yj) is
the output of the first party P1 and f2(xi, yj) is the out-
put of the second party P2. For millionaires’ problem,
the function is defined as follows [14, 15]. For w = 1, 2,
fw(xi, yj) =
{
1 if i > j;
0 if i ≤ j.
(1)
The protocol proceeds in a series of M iterations.
The dealer creates two sequences {al} and {bl}, l =
51, 2, . . . ,M , as follows.
ai = bj = f1(xi, yj) = f2(xi, yj).
For l 6= i, al =⊥ and for l 6= j, bl =⊥.
Next, the dealer splits the secret al into the shares a
1
l
and a2l , and the secret bl into the shares b
1
l and b
2
l , so
that al = a
1
l ⊕ a
2
l and bl = b
1
l ⊕ b
2
l , and gives the shares
{(a1l , b
1
l )} to P1 and the shares {(a
2
l , b
2
l )} to P2. In each
round l, P2 sends a
2
l to P1, who, in turn sends b
1
l to P2.
P1 learns the output value f1(xi, yj) in iteration i, and
P2 learns the output value f2(xi, yj) in iteration j. In a
round l 6= i P1 outputs ⊥ and in a round l 6= j P2 output
⊥. As we require three elements, 0, 1 and ⊥, we define
0 by 00, 1 by 11 and ⊥ by 01. Note that the dealer who
will distribute the shares is honest and can compute the
function described in Equation (1).
The algorithms in the Byzantine setting is same as the
fail-stop setting except some additional steps. In Byzan-
tine setting, the shares are signed by the dealer. As ex-
plained in [14, 15], exploiting the MAC signature, we can
resist the players to send a false share.
IV. QUANTUM SOLUTION OF
MILLIONAIRES’ PROBLEM IN NON-RATIONAL
SETTING
In this section, we propose a quantum version of mil-
lionaires’ problem. It is the quantum analogue of the
protocol of Gordon et al. in classical domain [14, 15].
However, their security proof is based on some computa-
tional hardness in classical domain. Whereas we exploit
the property of entanglement to provide security of the
protocol in the quantum domain.
Here, we exploit four Bell state basis [25]. The
maximally entangled two particle state is |g0〉 =
1√
2
[
|0〉1 |0〉2 + |1〉1 |1〉2
]
. This state is called Einstein,
Podolsky, Rosen Pair, in short EPR pair or Bell state.
There are four independent Bell states. They are
|g0〉 =
1√
2
[
|0〉
1
|0〉
2
+ |1〉
1
|1〉
2
]
, |g1〉 =
1√
2
[
|0〉
1
|0〉
2
− |1〉
1
|1〉
2
]
,
|g2〉 =
1√
2
[
|0〉
1
|1〉
2
+ |1〉
1
|0〉
2
]
, |g3〉 =
1√
2
[
|0〉
1
|1〉
2
− |1〉
1
|0〉
2
]
.
Here, subscript 1 stands for P1’s qubit and subscript 2
stands for P2’s qubit. We need any three of these orthog-
onal states. In this work, without loss of generality, we
consider |g0〉, |g1〉 and |g2〉.
Like classical case, the secret of P1 is i and the secret
of P2 is j, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ m where m is an integer.
They want to know whether i > j or i ≤ j. The dealer
supplies them two ordered lists, X = {x1, x2, . . . , xm}
to P1 and Y = {y1, y2, . . . , ym} to P2. P1 chooses xi
and P2 chooses yj from their respective lists and send
those to the dealer. Dealer will compute the function
and will distribute the shares (here, qubits) in such a way
that P1 will get the value of the function i.e f1(xi, yj) in
iteration i and P2 will get the value of the function i.e
f2(xi, yj) in iteration j. The protocol proceeds in a series
of m iteration. In a round l 6= i P1 outputs ⊥ and in a
round l 6= j P2 outputs ⊥. The Quantum solution of the
millionaires’ problem in non-rational setting, is described
in Algorithm 1 (QShareGen) and Algorithm 2 (ΠQMPFair ).
Inputs:
The inputs of the QShareGen are xi from P1 and yj from P2.
If one of the received inputs is not in the correct domain, then
both the parties are given ⊥.
Computation:
Dealer does the following:
1. (a) If f1(xi, yj) = f2(xi, yj) = 0, prepares two copies
of |g0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉
1
|0〉
2
+ |1〉
1
|1〉
2
). We denote them as∣∣g′
0
〉
and
∣∣g′′
0
〉
.
(b) If f1(xi, yj) = f2(xi, yj) = 1, prepares two copies
of |g1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉
1
|0〉
2
− |1〉 |1〉
2
). We denote them as∣∣g′
1
〉
and
∣∣g′′
1
〉
.
2. For each l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, l 6= i and l 6= j, prepares two
copies of |g2〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉
1
|1〉
2
+ |1〉
1
|0〉
2
).
3. For l = i, prepares one copy of
|g2〉 = 1√
2
(|1〉
1
|0〉
2
+ |0〉
1
|1〉
2
). We call that
∣∣g′
2
〉
.
4. For l = j, prepares one copy of
|g2〉 = 1√
2
(|1〉
1
|0〉
2
+ |0〉
1
|1〉
2
). We call that
∣∣g′′
2
〉
.
Output:
1. For l ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} dealer prepares a list listw of
shares for each party Pw, where w ∈ {1, 2} such that for
each round each player is given two qubits, marked as 1st
and 2nd, from two different entangled states.
(a) when l = i, P1 is given the first half from
∣∣g′
0
〉
or∣∣g′
1
〉
depending on the value of f1(xi, yj) and the first
half from the entangled state
∣∣g′
2
〉
. P2 is given the other
halves. For each party, the qubit from
∣∣g′
0
〉
or
∣∣g′
1
〉
is
marked as 1st qubit for that round and the qubit from∣∣g′
2
〉
is marked as 2nd qubit for that round.
(b) when l = j, P2 is given the second half from
∣∣g′′
0
〉
or∣∣g′′
1
〉
depending on the value of f2(xi, yj) and the second
half from the entangled state
∣∣g′′
2
〉
. P1 is given the first
halves. For each party, the qubit from
∣∣g′′
0
〉
or
∣∣g′′
1
〉
is
marked as 2nd qubit for that round and the qubit from∣∣g′′
2
〉
is marked as 1st qubit for that round.
(c) for all other rounds, P1 is given the first halves from
two different |g2〉 states, whereas P2 is given the other
halves from the same entangled states. For each party
the qubits are marked such a way that the 1st (resp.
2nd) qubit of P1 is correlated with the 1st (resp. 2nd)
qubit of P2.
(d) each list contains 2m number of qubits.
Algorithm 1: QShareGen
A. Security Analysis
A Byzantine player can behave arbitrarily. He can ma-
nipulate the shares (here, qubits) which he has obtained
from the dealer or may abort early. In this subsection we
will show how entanglement provides the security against
such manipulation. The aborting case will be discussed
next.
6Inputs:
Each of P1 and P2 receives his corresponding list of shares.
Computation:
The players do the following.
1. Each round is subdivided into two sub-rounds.
2. In first sub-round, P2 sends the first qubit of its list for
that round to P1.
3. In second sub-round, P1 sends the second qubit of its list
for that round to P2.
4. After receiving the qubits from P2, P1 measures the two
qubits in Bell basis.
(a) If l 6= i and the measurement result is |g0〉 or |g1〉
or |g3〉, aborts the protocol and reports forgery by P2. If
it is |g2〉, concludes ⊥.
(b) If l = i and the measurement result is |g2〉 or |g3〉,
then aborts the protocol and reports forgery by P2. If
the measurement result is |g0〉, concludes f1(xi, yj) = 0.
If it is |g1〉, concludes f1(xi, yj) = 1.
5. After receiving the qubits from P1, P2 measures the two
qubits in Bell basis.
(a) If l 6= j and the measurement result is |g0〉 or |g1〉
or |g3〉, aborts the protocol and reports forgery by P1. f
it is |g2〉, concludes ⊥.
(b) If l = j and the measurement result is |g2〉 or |g3〉,
then aborts the protocol and reports forgery by P1. If
the measurement result is |g0〉, concludes f2(xi, yj) = 0.
If it is |g1〉, concludes f2(xi, yj) = 1.
Output:
1. P1 obtains its output value i.e either 0 or 1 depending
upon f1(xi, yj) in iteration i whereas P2 obtains its
output value i.e either 0 or 1 depending upon f2(xi, yj)
in iteration j.
2. If P2 aborts in round l, i.e., does not send its share at
that round and l ≤ i, P1 outputs 1. If l > i, P1 has
already determined the output in iteration i. Thus it
outputs that value.
3. If P1 aborts in round l, i.e., does not send its share at
that round and l ≤ j, P2 outputs 0. If l > j, P2 has
already determined the output in iteration j. Thus it
outputs that value.
Algorithm 2: ΠQMPFair
1. Security against Forgery
Without loss of generality, let us assume that P1 tries
to manipulate the qubits obtained from the dealer in the
motivation to convey the wrong message to P2. Here,
manipulation means sending arbitrary qubit or swapping
the qubits of his list. This forgery is detected with sig-
nificant probability. Here, we assume that P1 sends an
arbitrary qubit to P2 in a round l. The analysis will be
same if we consider the swapping of the qubits of his list.
Like classical MAC signature, in quantum domain, en-
tanglement provides security against such forgery. Ac-
cording to the protocol, in round l 6= j, if no cheating
occurs, then P2 will get |g2〉 =
1√
2
[
|0〉1 |1〉2 + |1〉1 |0〉2
]
.
In terms of density matrix it can be written as
ρ =
1
2
(
|0〉1 |1〉2 + |1〉1 |0〉2
)(
〈0|1 〈1|2 + 〈1|1 〈0|2
)
.
Now, let us assume that P1 sends an arbitrary qubit
which is |φ〉 = [α |0〉3 + β |1〉3], instead of the correct
one. In terms of density matrix, the arbitrary state can
be written as
ρ3 = |φ〉 〈φ| =
[
|α|2 |0〉3 〈0|+ α
∗β |1〉3 〈0|+ αβ
∗ |0〉3 〈1|
+|β|2 |1〉3 〈1|
]
.
Thus, the state at the end of P2 would be
ρ2 = [trP1(ρ)](ρ3)
=
1
2
[
|1〉2 〈1|
(
|α|2 |0〉3 〈0|+ α
∗β |1〉3 〈0|+ αβ
∗ |0〉3 〈1|
+|β|2 |1〉3 〈1|
)
+ |0〉2 〈0|
(
|α|2 |0〉3 〈0|+ α
∗β |1〉3 〈0|
+αβ∗ |0〉3 〈1|+ |β|
2 |1〉3 〈1|
)]
.
In this case, when P2 will measure qubit 2 and qubit
3 in Bell basis, after measurement, P2 will get either |g0〉
or |g1〉 or |g2〉 or |g3〉 with probability
1
4 instead of |g2〉
only. The detailed calculations are given here. For the
rest of the paper, we will refer this section.
Let us assume that P2 obtains |g0〉 after measurement.
Thus, the probability that P2 obtains |g0〉 is given by
|g0〉23 〈g0| (ρ2) = 〈g0| ρ2 |g0〉23
=
1
4
[(
〈00|23 + 〈11|23
)[
|1〉2 〈1|
(
|α|2 |0〉3 〈0|
+α∗β |1〉3 〈0|+ αβ
∗ |0〉3 〈1|+ |β|
2 |1〉3 〈1|
)
+ |0〉2 〈0|
(
|α|2 |0〉3 〈0|+ α
∗β |1〉3 〈0|
+αβ∗ |0〉3 〈1|+ |β|
2 |1〉3 〈1|
)](
|00〉23 + |11〉23
)]
=
1
4
[
|α|2 + |β|2
]
=
1
4
.
If l 6= j, according to our protocol, P2 should get |g2〉
only. But as P1 sends an arbitrary qubit to P2, when
measured, P2 gets any one of the four Bell states with
probability 14 . Thus, if l 6= j and P2 gets |g0〉 or |g1〉 or
|g3〉, he immediately concludes that P1 is cheating. The
success probability of detecting such cheating for a round
l 6= j is 34 .
Similarly, when l = j, if P1 does not cheat, P2 would
get either |g0〉 or |g1〉 depending on the value of f2(xi, yj).
However, if P1 cheats, when measured, P2 will get any
one Bell state. In case of |g0〉 and |g1〉, he can not de-
tect the cheating because he does not know the value of
f2(xi, yj) a priori. However, if he gets |g2〉 or |g3〉, he
immediately detects the cheating with certainty. Thus,
the success probability of detecting the cheating when
l = j is 12 . As, P1 have no idea about the value of j, the
average success probability of detecting such cheating is
3
4
Pr(l 6= j) +
1
2
Pr(l = j) =
3
4
[Pr(l < j) + Pr(l > j)]
+
1
2
Pr(l = j).
7We do not bother about Pr(l > j) because, P2 should
have no incentive to detect the cheating when l > j, as
he has already got his output value in round j. Thus the
total success probability of P2 to detect such cheating is
3
4
Pr(l < j) +
1
2
Pr(l = j) =
3
4
.
j − 1
m
+
1
2
.
1
m
=
3j − 1
4m
Theorem 1. In non-rational setting, the success proba-
bility of P2 to detect cheating by P1 who is corrupted by
a Byzantine adversary in an arbitrary round l is 3j−14m .
Same conclusion can be drawn when we assume P2 is
corrupted. In this case, we modify the theorem in the
following way.
Theorem 2. In non-rational setting, the success proba-
bility of P1 to detect cheating by P2 who is corrupted by
a Byzantine adversary in an arbitrary round l is 3i−1
m
.
2. Fairness against Early Abort
As P1 is always computing its output first followed
by P2, the aborting of P1 plays an important role to
achieve the fairness of the protocol. The early abort of
P2 will terminate the protocol up to that round in which
P2 aborts. In that case, either both get the output or
none gets the output. Thus, early abort of P2 does not
affect the fairness condition. We now concentrate on the
early abort of P1.
Let us assume that P1 aborts in round l. There are
two cases: i ≤ j and i > j. We analyze each case one by
one.
Case 1: i ≤ j.
Subcase 1(a): l < i. In this case, P1 outputs ⊥ and
P2 outputs 0. In ideal world model, the trusted party
sends f1(xi, yj) to P1 in iteration i and f2(xi, yj) to P2
in iteration j. In all other rounds trusted party sends
⊥ to both P1 and P2. If a party (say P1) aborts the
protocol in an arbitrary round l after getting the output,
the trusted party sends the honest party (here, P2) the
value of f2(xl, yj). Thus when P1 aborts in round l < i,
P1 outputs ⊥ whereas P2 outputs f2(xl, yj). As i ≤ j and
l < i, then l < j. So f2(xl, yj) = 0 (refer to Equation 1).
Hence,
Pr
[(
V IEWideal(x, y), OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (⊥, 0)
∣∣∣l < i∧ i ≤ j
]
= Pr
[(
V IEWhybrid(x, y),OUThybrid(x, y)
)
= (⊥, 0)
∣∣∣l < i∧ i ≤ j
]
.
Subcase 1(b): l = i. In this case, P1 obtains the correct
output i.e. 0 and P2 outputs 0. In ideal model, when P1
aborts in round l = i, trusted party has already sent
0 to P1 and f2(xi, yj) to P2. As i ≤ j, f2(xi, yj) = 0
(Equation 1). Hence,
Pr
[(
V IEWideal(x, y), OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (0, 0)
∣∣∣l = i∧ i ≤ j
]
= Pr
[(
V IEWhybrid(x, y),OUThybrid(x, y)
)
= (0, 0)
∣∣∣l = i∧ i ≤ j
]
.
Subcase 1(c): l > i. Here two cases can arise. i) i <
l ≤ j, in this case, P1 obtains correct output and P2
outputs 0. ii) i = j < l, in this case, both P1 and P2
have already obtained 0. In ideal model, if P1 aborts in
round l > i, P1 has already got its output value whereas
trusted party sends f2(xl, yj) to P2. When i < l ≤ j,
then f2(xl, yj) = 0 (Equation 1) whereas for i = j, P2
has already got the correct output i.e 0. Hence,
Pr
[(
V IEWideal(x, y), OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (0, 0)
∣∣∣l > i∧ i ≤ j
]
= Pr
[(
V IEWhybrid(x, y), OUThybrid(x, y)
)
= (0, 0)
∣∣∣l > i∧ i ≤ j
]
.
Case 2: i > j.
Subcase 2(a): l ≤ j. In this case, P1 outputs ⊥ and P2
outputs 0. In ideal model, if P1 aborts in round l ≤ j, P1
outputs ⊥ and trusted party sends f2(xl, yj) to P2. As
l ≤ j, f2(xl, yj) = 0 (Equation 1). Hence,
Pr
[(
V IEWideal(x, y), OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (⊥, 0)
∣∣∣l ≤ j∧ i > j
]
= Pr
[(
V IEWhybrid(x, y), OUThybrid(x, y)
)
= (⊥, 0)
∣∣∣l ≤ j∧ i > j
]
.
Subcase 2(b): j < l < i. In this case, P1 obtains ⊥
and P2 gets the correct output i.e. 1. In ideal model,
if P1 aborts in round j < l < i, P1 is given ⊥ whereas
the trusted party sends f2(xl, yj) to P2. As j < l, then
f2(xl, yj) = 1 (Equation 1). Hence,
Pr
[(
V IEWideal(x, y), OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (⊥, 1)
∣∣∣j < l < i∧ i > j
]
= Pr
[(
V IEWhybrid(x, y), OUThybrid(x, y)
)
= (⊥, 1)
∣∣∣j < l < i∧ i >
j
]
.
Subcase 2(c): j < l = i. In this case, P1 and P2 both
obtain the correct output i.e. 1. In ideal model, if P1
aborts in round j < l = i, P1 is given 1 whereas the
trusted party sends f2(xl, yj) to P2. As j < l = i, then
f2(xl, yj) = f2(xi, yj) = 1 (Equation 1). Hence,
Pr
[(
V IEWideal(x, y), OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (1, 1)
∣∣∣j < l = i∧ i > j
]
= Pr
[(
V IEWhybrid(x, y), OUThybrid(x, y)
)
= (1, 1)
∣∣∣j < l = i∧ i >
j
]
.
When i < l < m, P1 has no incentive to abort as in this
case both P1 and P2 have already obtain their respective
outputs.
Hence, from the above analysis, we can conclude that
in the hybrid model, the adversary does no more harm
than the ideal scenario. Thus our protocol achieve fair-
ness in non-rational setting.
Theorem 3. In non-rational setting, the protocolΠQMPFair
achieves fairness.
V. QUANTUM SOLUTION OF MILLIONAIRES’
PROBLEM IN RATIONAL SETTING
As discussed in Section II F 2, the definition of fairness
changes in rational setting. Thus, we have to modify our
protocol in Section IV for rational setting.
Our proposed protocol is described in Algorithm 3
(QRShareGen) and Algorithm 4 (ΠQRMPFair ). Here, some
additional assumptions are required. For example, un-
like the non-rational setting, both the players obtain the
value of the function in a specific round called revelation
round. We denote this by r. The position of r in m
number of iteration is not revealed to the players and is
8Inputs:
The inputs of the QRShareGen are xi from P1 and yj from P2.
If one of the received inputs is not in the correct domain, then
both the parties are given ⊥.
Computation:
Dealer does the following:
1. Chooses r according to a geometric distribution G(γ)
with parameter γ and sets it as the revelation round, i.e.,
the round in which the value of f(xi, yj) = (0, 0) or
(1, 1).
2. Chooses d according to the geometrical distribution G(γ)
and sets the total number of iterations as m = r + d.
3. For the revelation round, i.e., when l = r, dealer does the
following:
(a) If f(xi, yj) = (0, 0), prepares two copies of
|g0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉
1
|0〉
2
+ |1〉
1
|1〉
2
).
(b) If f(xi, yj) = (1, 1), prepares two copies of
|g1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉
1
|0〉
2
− |1〉 |1〉
2
).
4. For each l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, l 6= r, prepares two copies of
|g2〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉
1
|1〉
2
+ |1〉
1
|0〉
2
).
Output:
1. For l ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} dealer prepares a list listw of
shares for each party Pw , where w ∈ {1, 2} such that for
each round each player is given two qubits, marked as 1st
and 2nd, from two different entangled states.
(a) when l = r, P1 is given 1st halves from two copies of
|g0〉 or |g1〉 depending on the value of f(xi, yj) and P2 is
given the second halves from the same entangled states.
(b) for all other rounds, P1 is given first halves from
two different |g2〉 states, whereas P2 is given the
remaining halves from the same entangled states.
(c) The marking of the qubits for a round for each
party is such that the 1st (resp. 2nd) qubit of P1 is
correlated with the 1st (resp. 2nd) qubit of P2.
(d) each list contains 2m number of qubits.
Algorithm 3: QRShareGen
chosen according to a geometric distribution G(γ), where
the parameter γ in turn depends on the utility values of
the players. We here assume that γ <
UTTw −UNNw
UTNw −UNNw . An-
other assumption is that if any player chooses abort in
any round l, we tell him whether this round is the reve-
lation round or not [18]. The term and condition of the
game is that knowing whether the round is the revelation
round or not, no player can revise his decision. Now we
show that under this restriction and an assumption that
γ <
UTTw −UNNw
UTNw −UNNw , our protocol achieves fairness.
A. Security Analysis
A Byzantine player can manipulate the share as well
as can abort early. Firstly, we analyze the security issues
assuming that the player manipulates the share. Sec-
ondly, we analyze fairness of the protocol considering
early abort of the corrupted player.
1. Security against Forgery
Without loss of generality, let us assume that P1 is
corrupted by the Byzantine adversary and can manipu-
Inputs:
Each of P1 and P2 receives his corresponding list of shares.
Computation:
The players do the following.
1. Each round is subdivided into two sub-rounds.
2. In first sub-round, P2 sends the first qubit of its list for
that round to P1.
3. In second sub-round, P1 sends the second qubit of its list
for that round to P2.
4. After receiving the qubits from P2, P1 measures the two
qubits in Bell basis.
(a) If in any round l the measurement result is |g3〉, P1
aborts the protocol and reports forgery by P2.
(b) Otherwise, if the measurement result is |g0〉,
concludes f1(xi, yj) = 0. If it is |g1〉, concludes
f1(xi, yj) = 1. If it is |g2〉, concludes ⊥.
5. After receiving the qubits from P1, P2 measures the two
qubits in Bell basis.
(a) If in any round l the measurement result is |g3〉, P2
aborts the protocol and reports forgery by P1.
(b) Otherwise, if the measurement result is |g0〉,
concludes f2(xi, yj) = 0. If it is |g1〉, concludes
f2(xi, yj) = 1. If it is |g2〉, concludes ⊥.
Output:
1. P1 and P2 obtain their outputs in iteration r.
2. If P2 aborts in round l, i.e., does not send its share at
that round and l ≤ r, P1 outputs ⊥. If l > r, P1 has
already determined the output in iteration r. Thus it
outputs that value.
3. If P1 aborts in round l, i.e., does not send its share at
that round and l ≤ r, P2 outputs ⊥. If l > r, P2 has
already determined the output in iteration r. Thus it
outputs that value.
Algorithm 4: ΠQRMPFair
late the share (here, qubit). He can send an arbitrary
qubit to P2 or can swap the qubits of his list and can
send an uncorrelated qubit to P2. The analysis is almost
same as Subsection IVA 1. The forgery is detected with
significant probability.
If no cheating occurs, then in round l 6= r, P2 will get
|g2〉 =
1√
2
[
|0〉1 |1〉2 + |1〉1 |0〉2
]
. Now, let us assume that
P1 sends an arbitrary share |φ〉 = [α |0〉3+β |1〉3] instead
of the correct one. Thus, at round l 6= r, the state at the
end of P2 would be
ρ2 = [trP1(ρ)](ρ3)
=
1
2
[
|1〉2 〈1|
(
|α|2 |0〉3 〈0|+ α
∗β |1〉3 〈0|
+αβ∗ |0〉3 〈1|+ |β|
2 |1〉3 〈1|
)
+ |0〉2 〈0|
(
|α|2 |0〉3 〈0|+ α
∗β |1〉3 〈0|
+αβ∗ |0〉3 〈1|+ |β|
2 |1〉3 〈1|
)]
,
where ρ = 12 (|0〉1 |1〉2 + |1〉1 |0〉2)(〈0|1 〈1|2 + 〈1|1 〈0|2)
and ρ3 = [|α|
2 |0〉3 〈0| + α
∗β |1〉3 〈0| + αβ
∗ |0〉3 〈1| +
|β|2 |1〉3 〈1|].
P2 will measure qubit 2 and qubit 3. After measure-
ment, P2 will get either |g0〉 or |g1〉 or |g2〉 or |g3〉 with
probability 14 instead of |g2〉 only (see Section IVA1).
9As P2 has no idea about the position of the revelation
round, when he gets |g0〉 or |g1〉, he conclude that this
is the revelation round. When he gets |g2〉, he concludes
that l 6= r. Only if he gets |g3〉, he immediately concludes
that P1 is cheating. The success probability of detecting
such cheating for a round l 6= r is 14 .
Similarly, when l = r, if P1 does not cheat, P2 would
get either |g0〉 or |g1〉 depending on the value of f2(xi, yj).
However, if P1 cheats, when measured, P2 will get any
one Bell state. In case of |g0〉 and |g1〉, he can not de-
tect the cheating because he does not know the value of
f2(xi, yj) a priori. Again, if he gets |g2〉 he also does not
detect the cheating, as in this case, he concludes that
l 6= r. P2 can immediately detect the cheating with cer-
tainty if and only if he gets |g3〉. Thus, the success prob-
ability of detecting the cheating when l = r is also 14 .
As, P1 have no idea about the position of r, the average
success probability of P2 to detect such cheating for a
round l is
1
4
Pr(l 6= r) +
1
4
Pr(l = r) =
1
4
[Pr(l < r) + Pr(l > r)]
+
1
4
Pr(l = r).
We do not bother about Pr(l > r) because, P2 should
have no incentive to detect the cheating when l > r, as
he has already got f2(xi, yj) in round r. Thus the total
success probability of detecting the cheating is
1
4
Pr(l < r) +
1
4
Pr(l = r) =
1
4
(1− γ) +
1
4
γ =
1
4
According to our protocol, if P2 detects cheating, he
will abort the protocol. Thus, if 14 < U
TT
1 , P1 has no
incentive to forge in any round. Same thing happens if
we assume that P2 is corrupted by the adversary.
Theorem 4. In rational setting, the success probabil-
ity of an honest player to detect cheating in an arbitrary
round l by a player who is corrupted by a Byzantine ad-
versary is 14 .
Theorem 5. In rational setting, if 14 < U
TT
w , where w ∈
{1, 2}, no player has any incentive to forge in a round l.
Same conclusion can be drawn if we assume that P1
swaps the quits of his list and sends an uncorrelated qubit
to P2.
2. Fairness against Early Abort
We have mentioned earlier that a player who is cor-
rupted by a Byzantine adversary can abort early. As P1
is always computing its output first followed by P2, the
aborting of P1 plays an important role to achieve the fair-
ness of the protocol. The early abort of P2 will terminate
the protocol up to that round in which P2 aborts. In that
case, either both get the correct outputs or none gets the
correct outputs. Thus, early abort of P2 does not affect
the fairness condition. We now concentrate on the early
abort of P1.
Let us assume that P1 aborts in round l. According
to our protocol if P1 declares early abort, we will tell
whether the round is the revelation round or not. Know-
ing that P1 can not revise his decision. If l < r, P1 gets
|g2〉, whereas P2 outputs ⊥. That means in this case,
the utility of P1 is U
NN
1 (no one gets the output). If P1
aborts in round l = r, P1 gets either |g0〉 or |g1〉 depend-
ing on the value of f1(xi, yj) and P2 outputs ⊥. In this
case, the utility of P1 is U
TN
1 (P1 gets the output and
P2 does not). P1 should have no incentive to abort in
round l > r, as in this case P1 and P2 both have already
obtained the value of the function in iteration r. Thus,
the expected utility of P1 is
UNN1 Pr(l < r) + U
TN
1 Pr(l = r) = U
NN
1 (1− γ) + U
TN
1 γ
According to our assumption that γ <
UTTw −UNNw
UTNw −UNNw , we
can write UNN1 (1−γ)+U
TN
1 γ < U
TT
1 . Hence, P1 should
have no incentive to abort early in the protocol and the
protocol achieves fairness.
Theorem 6. In rational setting, provided R1 (Sec-
tion II), 0 < γ < 1 and UTNw + (1 − γ)U
NN
w < U
TT
w for
all w ∈ {1, 2}, the protocol ΠQRMPFair achieves fairness.
Now we are in a position to prove strict Nash equilib-
rium for our protocol ΠQRMPFair .
Theorem 7. In rational setting, provided 14 < U
TT
w , R1
(Section II), 0 < γ < 1 and UTNw + (1 − γ)U
NN
w < U
TT
w
for all w ∈ {1, 2}, the protocol ΠQRMPFair achieves strict
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. In Theorem 5, it has been shown that if 14 < U
TT
w ,
where w ∈ {1, 2}, no player has any incentive to cheat.
It will be better for him to follow the suggested strategy
as by cheating he can not increase his payoff. Further
in Theorem 6, we proved that provided R1 (Section II),
0 < γ < 1 and UTNw + (1 − γ)U
NN
w < U
TT
w for all w ∈
{1, 2}, no player has any incentive to abort early. In this
case also, deviation from the suggested strategy does not
help him to gain more payoff. In other word, we have
uw(σ
′
w ,
−→σ −w) < uw(−→σ ) for any player Pw, w ∈ {1, 2}
and hence the player Pw always follows the suggested
strategy.
VI. SECURE TWO-PARTY COMPUTATION
INVOLVING EMBEDDED XOR
In this section, we first describe the embedded XOR
problem proposed by Gordon et al. [14]. Let us denote
two players by P1 and P2. Player P1 is given an ordered
list {x1, x2, x3} and P2 is given an ordered list {y1, y2}.
P1 randomly chooses the input from the ordered list and
sent to the dealer. P2 also randomly chooses the input
from his list and delivers to the dealer. Dealer calculates
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the function. For convenience, we here recall the table
for f given in [14].
y1 y2
x1 0 1
x2 1 0
x3 1 1
The function can be described as
fw(x, y) =
{
1 if i 6= j;
0 if i = j.
(2)
where, x and y denote the inputs from P1 and P2 re-
spectively and w ∈ {1, 2} The protocol proceeds in a
series of M iterations, where M = ω(logλ), λ is the
security parameter. The dealer chooses the revelation
round r according to geometric distribution with param-
eter γ. The dealer then creates two sequences {al} and
{bl}, l = 1, 2, . . . ,M , as follows.
For l ≥ r, al = f1(x, y) = bl = f2(x, y).
For l < r, al = f1(x, yˆ), bl = f2(xˆ, y),
where xˆ (or yˆ) is a random value of x (or y) chosen by
the dealer.
Next, the dealer splits the secret al into the shares a
1
l
and a2l , and the secret bl into the shares b
1
l and b
2
l , so
that al = a
1
l ⊕ a
2
l and bl = b
1
l ⊕ b
2
l , and gives the shares
{(a1l , b
1
l )} to P1 and the shares {(a
2
l , b
2
l )} to P2. In each
round l, P2 sends a
2
l to P1, who, in turn sends b
1
l to
P2. P1 (res. P2) learns the output value f1(x, y) (res.
f2(x, y)) in iteration r. Here we assume that the dealer
who will distribute the shares is honest and can compute
the function described in Equation (2).
The algorithms in the Byzantine setting are the same
as those in the fail-stop setting except some additional
steps. In Byzantine setting, the shares are signed by the
dealer. Exploiting MAC signature we can resist a player
to send a false share.
VII. QUANTUM PROTOCOL FOR EMBEDDED
XOR IN NON-RATIONAL SETTING
We suitably modify the classical protocol by Gordon et
al. to propose a quantum solution of the embedded XOR
problem. As in the quantum protocol to solve the mil-
lionaires’ problem, here also we exploit entangled states
to obtain the security.
Now we describe the protocol. Let P1 is given an or-
dered list {x1, x2, x3} and P2 is given an ordered list
{y1, y2}. P1 randomly chooses an input x from his or-
dered list and sends to the dealer. Similarly, P2 also
chooses an input y randomly from his ordered list and
sends to the dealer. Dealer computes the function and
creates two sequences {al} and {bl}, l = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
where m is the total number of the round in such a way
that
For l ≥ r, al = f1(x, y) = bl = f2(x, y) and
Forl < r, al = f1(x, yˆ), bl = f2(xˆ, y),
where xˆ (or yˆ) is a random value of x (or y) chosen by the
dealer. In quantum domain, the two sequences {al} and
{bl} are distributed by exploiting the qubits of entan-
gled states. The mechanism is described in Algorithm 5
(QEShareGen) and Algorithm 6 (ΠQEPFair ).
A. Security Analysis
In this subsection we discuss the security issues against
a Byzantine adversary. First, we analyze the sensitiv-
ity of our protocol to detect a cheating by a Byzantine
player. Then we analyze the fairness issue when a player
aborts early.
1. Security against Forgery
Without loss of generality, we assume that P1 is cor-
rupted by the Byzantine adversary and tries to manip-
ulate the qubits. According to our protocol, in any
round l ≤ r, if P1 does not cheat, P2 will measure ei-
ther |g0〉 or |g1〉 depending on the value of bl. However,
when P1 cheats, the case will be different. Let us as-
sume that in round l ≤ r, P1 sends an arbitrary qubit
|φ〉 = α |0〉3 + β |1〉3 to P2. Here, we assume that if P1
would not cheat at the round l, P2 would receive |g0〉.
Same thing happen if we assume that P2 will receive |g1〉.
Thus the final state at the end of P2 would be
ρ2 = [trP1(ρ)](ρ3)
=
1
2
[
|1〉2 〈1|
(
|α|2 |0〉3 〈0|+ α
∗β |1〉3 〈0|
+αβ∗ |0〉3 〈1|+ |β|
2 |1〉3 〈1|
)
+ |0〉2 〈0|
(
|α|2 |0〉3 〈0|+ α
∗β |1〉3 〈0|
+αβ∗ |0〉3 〈1|+ |β|
2 |1〉3 〈1|
)]
,
where ρ = 12 (|0〉1 |1〉2 + |1〉1 |0〉2)(〈0|1 〈1|2 + 〈1|1 〈0|2)
and ρ3 = [|α|
2 |0〉3 〈0| + α
∗β |1〉3 〈0| + αβ
∗ |0〉3 〈1| +
|β|2 |1〉3 〈1|].
P2 will measure qubit 2 and qubit 3. Thus, after mea-
surement, P2 will get either |g0〉 or |g1〉 or |g2〉 or |g3〉 with
probability 14 instead of |g0〉 only (see Section IVA 1). As
in round l ≤ r, P2 will measure either |g0〉 or |g1〉 with-
out any cheating, when he gets |g0〉 or |g1〉, he can not
detect cheating. If he gets |g2〉 or |g3〉, he immediately
concludes that P1 is cheating. Thus, the success proba-
bility of detecting such cheating for any round l ≤ r is 12 .
After the revelation round, P2 has no incentive to detect
cheating as P2 has already got the correct output. Thus,
we can write the expected success probability of P2 to
detect cheating by P1 is
1
2
Pr(l < r) +
1
2
Pr(l = r) =
1
2
(1− γ) +
1
2
γ =
1
2
.
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The same situation arises when we assume that P2 is
cheating.
Theorem 8. In non-rational setting, in an arbitrary
round l ≤ r, the success probability of an honest player to
detect cheating by a player who is corrupted by a Byzan-
tine adversary is 12 .
The swapping of the qubits in a round i.e interchanging
the position of the 1st and 2nd qubits can be analyzed
in the same manner.
2. Fairness against Early Abort
In this subsection we will show how the fairness condi-
tion is maintained when a player corrupted by a Byzan-
tine adversary aborts the protocol prematurely. Let us
assume that P1 aborts in round l. As P1 is always com-
puting its output first followed by P2, the aborting of
P1 plays an important role to achieve the fairness of the
protocol. The early abort of P2 will terminate the pro-
tocol up to that round in which P2 aborts. In that case,
either both get the correct value or none gets the correct
value. Thus, early abort of P2 does not affect the fairness
condition.
According to our protocol, if P1 aborts in a round l < r,
P2 outputs bl−1 = f2(xˆ, y). In this case P1 outputs al
which is equal to f1(x, yˆ). In ideal model, for l < r the
trusted party sends f1(x, yˆ) to P1 and f2(xˆ, y) to P2.
Thus, if P1 aborts in round l < r, P1 gets f1(x, yˆ) and
the trusted party sends f2(xˆ, y) to P2. Thus for l < r,
we get
Pr
[(
V IEWideal(x, y), OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (f(x, yˆ), f(xˆ, y))|l < r
]
= Pr
[(
V IEWhybrid(x, y), OUThybrid(x, y)
)
= (f(x, yˆ), f(xˆ, y))|l <
r
]
.
When l = r, P1 has already got the correct output
whereas P2 outputs br−1 = f2(xˆ, y). In ideal model, when
l = r, the trusted party sends f1(x, y) (res. f2(x, y)) to
P1 (res. P2). The following analysis shows how fairness
is maintained in this case.
Here, we first recall the table for embedded XOR. We
get that in case of P1, Pr[f1(x1, yˆ) = 0] = Pr[f1(x2, yˆ) =
0] = Pr[y ∈ {y1, y2}] =
1
2 and Pr[f1(x1, yˆ) = 1] =
Pr[f1(x2, yˆ) = 1] = Pr[y ∈ {y1, y2}] =
1
2 whereas
Pr[f1(x3, yˆ) = 0] = 0 and Pr[f1(x3, yˆ) = 1] = 1. In
case of P2, Pr[f2(xˆ, y) = 0] = Pr[x = x1] =
1
3 and
Pr[f2(xˆ, y) = 1] = Pr[x ∈ {x2, x3}] =
2
3 . Thus, we can
write the followings.
Pr
[(
V IEWideal(x, y),OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (0, 0)
∣∣∣l = r
]
=
1
3
.
1
3
,
Pr
[(
V IEWideal(x, y),OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (0, 1)
∣∣∣l = r
]
=
1
3
.
2
3
,
Pr
[(
V IEWideal(x, y),OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (1, 0)
∣∣∣l = r
]
=
2
3
.
1
3
,
Pr
[(
V IEWideal(x, y),OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (1, 1)
∣∣∣l = r
]
=
2
3
.
2
3
.
Similarly, in hybrid world,
Pr
[(
V IEWhybrid(x, y), OUThybrid(x, y)
)
= (0, 0)
∣∣∣l = r
]
=
1
3
.
1
3
,
Pr
[(
V IEWhybrid(x, y), OUThybrid(x, y)
)
= (0, 1)
∣∣∣l = r
]
=
1
3
.
2
3
,
Pr
[(
V IEWhybrid(x, y), OUThybrid(x, y)
)
= (1, 0)
∣∣∣l = r
]
=
2
3
.
1
3
,
Pr
[(
V IEWhybrid(x, y), OUThybrid(x, y)
)
= (1, 1)
∣∣∣l = r
]
=
2
3
.
2
3
.
Above probability calculations show that when l = r the
adversary does not do more harm in hybrid world than
that he can do in the ideal world. Thus, our protocol
achieves fairness.
Fairness is obvious if we consider the abort of P1 at
a round l > r, as in this situation, both in ideal world
and in hybrid world, P1 as well as P2 obtain the correct
output in iteration r.
Theorem 9. In non-rational setting, in an arbitrary
round l, the protocol ΠQEPFair achieves fairness consider-
ing early abort of a corrupted player.
VIII. QUANTUM PROTOCOL FOR
EMBEDDED XOR IN RATIONAL SETTING
In rational setting fairness means either everyone gets
the correct output value or none gets it. Thus, in rational
setting, we redefined the fairness condition (Section II).
It is immediate that when P1 chooses x = x3, he should
have no incentive to continue the game, as in certainty,
he knows that the output value is equal to 1. In this
situation, P2 outputs f2(xˆ, y) which may be 0 with prob-
ability 13 and may be 1 with probability
2
3 . Thus, fairness
condition in rational setting is violated. To mitigate the
problem, we have to modify our protocol. In rational
setting, we only modify step 2 of the output portion of
the protocol ΠQEPFair . If P1 aborts in any round l ≤ r,
instead of bl−1, P2 outputs 1. Now, we will show how
our new protocol ΠQEP2Fair achieves fairness under some
suitable choice of the parameters in the rational setting.
A. Security Analysis
The security analysis against Byzantine adversary in
rational setting is proceed exactly the same manner as
the security analysis against Byzantine adversary in non-
rational setting. We first analyze the cheating situation
and then will discuss the fairness issue when a player
aborts early.
1. Security against Forgery
This goes exactly the same way as it goes in non-
rational setting.
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Inputs:
The inputs of the QEShareGen are x from P1 and y from P2.
If one of the received inputs is not in the correct domain, then
both the parties are given ⊥.
Computation:
Dealer does the following:
1. Chooses r according to a geometric distribution G(γ)
with parameter γ and sets it as the revelation round, i.e.,
the round in which the value of f(x, y) = (0, 0) or (1, 1).
2. Chooses d according to the geometrical distribution G(γ)
and sets the total number of iterations as m = r + d.
3. For P1
(A) For l < r, in each round, the dealer calculates
al = f1(x, yˆ), where yˆ is a random variable chosen by the
dealer from the ordered list of P2.
(i) If al = 0, prepares |g0〉. We call it
∣∣g′
0
〉
<r
.
(ii) If al = 1, prepares |g1〉. We call it
∣∣g′
1
〉
<r
.
(B) For l ≥ r, the dealer calculates al = f1(x, y).
(i) If al = 0, prepares |g0〉. We mark it as
∣∣g′
0
〉
≥r .
(ii) If al = 1, prepares |g1〉. We mark it as
∣∣g′
1
〉
≥r .
For P2
(A) For l < r, in each round, the dealer calculates
bl = f2(xˆ, y), where xˆ is a random variable chosen by the
dealer from the ordered list of P1.
(i) If bl = 0, prepares |g0〉. We call it
∣∣g′′
0
〉
<r
.
(ii) If bl = 1, prepares |g1〉. We call it
∣∣g′′
1
〉
<r
.
(B) For l ≥ r, the dealer calculates bl = f2(x, y).
(i) If bl = 0, prepares |g0〉. We mark it as
∣∣g′′
0
〉
≥r .
(ii) If bl = 1, prepares |g1〉. We mark it as
∣∣g′′
1
〉
≥r.
Output:
1. For l ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} dealer prepares a list listw of
shares for each party Pw , where w ∈ {1, 2} such that:
(a) For l < r, in each round P1 is given the first half
from
∣∣g′
0
〉
<r
or
∣∣g′
1
〉
<r
depending on the value of al.
This qubit is marked as 1st qubit for that round. P1 is
also given the first half from
∣∣g′′
0
〉
<r
or
∣∣g′′
1
〉
<r
depending on the value of bl. This qubit is marked as
2nd qubit for that round.
(b) For l ≥ r, in each round P1 is given the first half
from
∣∣g′
0
〉
≥r or
∣∣g′
1
〉
≥r depending on the value of al.
This qubit is marked as 1st qubit for that round. P1 is
also given the first half from
∣∣g′′
0
〉
≥r or
∣∣g′′
1
〉
≥r
depending on the value of bl. This qubit is marked as
2nd qubit for that round.
(c) Similarly, for l < r, in each round P2 is given the
remaining half from
∣∣g′
0
〉
<r
or
∣∣g′
1
〉
<r
depending on the
value of al. This qubit is marked as 1st qubit for that
round. P2 is also given the remaining half from
∣∣g′′
0
〉
<r
or
∣∣g′′
1
〉
<r
depending on the value of bl. This qubit is
marked as 2nd qubit for that round.
(d) For l ≥ r, in each round P2 is given the remaining
half from
∣∣g′
0
〉
≥r or
∣∣g′
1
〉
≥r depending on the value of al.
This qubit is marked as 1st qubit for that round. P2 is
also given the remaining half from
∣∣g′′
0
〉
≥r or
∣∣g′′
1
〉
≥r
depending on the value of bl. This qubit is marked as
2nd qubit for that round.
2. Each list consists of 2m number of qubits.
Algorithm 5: QEShareGen
Theorem 10. In rational setting, in an arbitrary round
l ≤ r, the success probability of an honest player to de-
tect cheating by a player who is corrupted by a Byzantine
adversary is 12 .
If UTTw , where w ∈ {1, 2}, is greater than
1
2 , Pw should
have no incentive to cheat. Thus,
Theorem 11. In rational setting, if 12 < U
TT
w , where
Inputs:
Each of P1, P2 receives his corresponding list of shares.
Computation:
The players do the following.
1. Each round is subdivided into two sub-rounds.
2. In first sub-round, P2 sends the first qubit of its list to
P1.
3. In second sub-round, P1 sends the second qubit of its list
to P2.
4. After receiving the qubits from P2, P1 measures the two
qubits in Bell basis. If it will be |g0〉, then concludes
al = 0. If it will be |g1〉, concludes al = 1.
5. After receiving the qubits from P1, P2 measures the two
qubits in Bell basis. If it will be |g0〉, then concludes
bl = 0. If it will be |g1〉, concludes bl = 1.
6. If in any round, any player Pw , measures |g2〉 or |g3〉, he
immediately aborts the protocol and reports forgery by
the other player.
Output:
1. If P2 aborts in round l, i.e., does not send its share at
that round and l ≤ r, P1 outputs al−1. If l > r, P1 has
already determined the correct output in iteration r.
Thus it outputs that value.
2. If P1 aborts in round l, i.e., does not send its share at
that round and l ≤ r, P2 outputs bl−1. If l > r, P2 has
already determined the correct output in iteration r.
Thus it outputs that value.
Algorithm 6: ΠQEPFair
w ∈ {1, 2}, no player has any incentive to forge in a
round l.
2. Fairness against Early Abort
The analysis against Byzantine adversary when he
chooses early abort is analyzed in this subsection. We do
not bother about the early abort of P2, as early abort-
ing of P2 does not affect the fairness condition of the
protocol.
Early abort by P1
Now, we discuss each case one by one.
Case 1: x = x1. We have Pr(al = 0|x = x1) = Pr(yˆ =
y1) =
1
2 and Pr(al = 1|x = x1) = Pr(yˆ = y2) =
1
2 , for
l < r. Note that for l = r, P1 will abort after receiving
the exact value of y. Hence, in case of y = y1,
Pr(ar = 0|(x1, y1)) = 1,Pr(ar = 1|(x1, y1)) = 0
and in case of y = y2,
Pr(ar = 0|(x1, y2)) = 0,Pr(ar = 1|(x1, y2)) = 1.
Subcase 1(a): y = y1. Now, we have Pr(bl = 0|y =
y1) = 0 and Pr(bl = 1|y = y1) = 1.
The following table enumerates the different possibili-
ties for U1 when x = x1 and y = y1.
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(al, bl) U1 Probability
l < r l = r
(0,0) UTT1 (1 − γ) ·
1
2 · 0 = 0 γ · 1 · 0 = 0
(0,1) UTN1 (1− γ) ·
1
2 · 1 = (1 − γ) ·
1
2 γ · 1 · 1 = γ · 1
(1,0) UNT1 (1− γ) ·
1
2 · 0 = (1− γ) · 0 γ · 0 · 0 = 0
(1,1) UNN1 (1− γ) ·
1
2 · 1 = (1 − γ) ·
1
2 γ · 0 · 1 = 0
Thus, the expected utility of P1 in this case is
E[U1|(x1, y1)] = (1− γ)
[1
2
UTN1 +
1
2
UNN1
]
+ γ
[
UTN1
]
=
(1 + γ)
2
(
UTN1
)
+
(1− γ)
2
(
UNN1
)
.
Subcase 1(b): y = y2. Now, we have Pr(bl = 0|y =
y2) = 0 and Pr(bl = 1|y = y2) = 1.
The following table enumerates the different possibili-
ties for U1 when x = x1 and y = y2.
(al, bl) U1 Probability
l < r l = r
(0,0) UNN1 (1− γ) ·
1
2 · 0 = (1− γ) · 0 γ · 0 · 0 = 0
(0,1) UNT1 (1− γ) ·
1
2 · 1 = (1− γ) ·
1
2 γ · 0 · 1 = 0
(1,0) UTN1 (1− γ) ·
1
2 · 0 = (1− γ) · 0 γ · 1 · 0 = 0
(1,1) UTT1 (1− γ) ·
1
2 · 1 = (1− γ) ·
1
2 γ · 1 · 1 = γ
Thus, the expected utility of P1 in this case is
E[U1|(x1, y2)] = (1− γ)
(1
2
UTT1 +
1
2
UNT1
)
+ γ
(
UTT1
)
=
(1 + γ)
2
(
UTT1
)
+
(1− γ)
2
(
UNT1
)
.
Now, combining all two subcases, we get
E[U1|x1]
= E[U1|(x1, y1)] · Pr(y = y1) + E[U1|(x1, y2)] · Pr(y = y2)
=
[ (1 + γ)
2
(
UTN1
)
+
(1− γ)
2
(
UNN1
)]
·
1
2
+
[ (1 + γ)
2
(
UTT1
)
+
(1− γ)
2
(
UNT1
)]
·
1
2
=
(1 + γ)
4
(
UTN1 + U
TT
1
)
+
(1 − γ)
4
(
UNN1 + U
NT
1
)
.
If the above expression is greater than or equal to UTT1 ,
P1 chooses abort. Thus, for fairness, we need to ensure
that UTT1 >
(1+γ)
4
(
UTN1 +U
TT
1
)
+ (1−γ)4
(
UNN1 +U
NT
1
)
,
i.e.,
γ <
3UTT1 − U
TN
1 − U
NN
1 − U
NT
1
UTN1 + U
TT
1 − U
NN
1 − U
NT
1
. (3)
Case 2: x = x2. The analysis is similar and we obtain
the same expression for E[U1|x2]. More specifically, we
have the following observation.
Subcase 2(a): y = y1. The analysis is exactly identical
to Subcase 1(b).
Subcase 2(b): y = y2. The analysis is exactly identical
to Subcase 1(a).
Case 3: x = x3. When x = x3, P1 will abort as he knows
the output with certainty. In this case, he needs no help
from P2 to compute the function. However, when P1
chooses to abort, P2 outputs 1. Thus, for x = x3, both
get the correct output of the function. The utility for
both the player is UTTw , w ∈ {1, 2}. Hence, the fairness
condition in rational setting is always maintained.
3. Fairness Condition
From the above analysis, we can state the following
result.
Theorem 12. Provided R1 (Section II), (U
TT
1 −U
NN
1 )+
(UTT1 − U
NT
1 ) > (U
TN
1 − U
TT
1 ), and
0 < γ <
3UTT1 − U
TN
1 − U
NN
1 − U
NT
1
UTN1 + U
TT
1 − U
NN
1 − U
NT
1
,
the protocol ΠCEP2Fair achieves fairness.
Proof. The proof follows from Equations (3). The addi-
tional condition
(UTT1 − U
NN
1 ) + (U
TT
1 − U
NT
1 ) > (U
TN
1 − U
TT
1 ) (4)
follows from the fact that for γ to be meaningful, the
numerator 3UTT1 − U
TN
1 − U
NN
1 − U
NT
1 must be ≥ 0.
Further, from the condition γ <
3UTT
1
−UTN
1
−UNN
1
−UNT
1
UTN
1
+UTT
1
−UNN
1
−UNT
1
,
it is easy to see that the natural restriction γ < 1 always
holds.
In Equation (4), all the three terms within the paren-
theses are non-negative according to R1.
4. Strict Nash Equilibrium
Combining the above results, we can state the follow-
ing.
Theorem 13. Provided 12 < U
TT
w for w ∈ {1, 2}, R1
(Section II), (UTT1 − U
NN
1 ) + (U
TT
1 − U
NT
1 ) > (U
TN
1 −
UTT1 ), and
0 < γ <
3UTT1 − U
TN
1 − U
NN
1 − U
NT
1
UTN1 + U
TT
1 − U
NN
1 − U
NT
1
,
the protocol ΠCEP2Fair achieve strict Nash equilibrium.
Proof. From Theorem 11, we get that provided 12 < U
TT
w
for w ∈ {1, 2}, no player has any incentive to cheat as he
can not increase his payoff by cheating. In case of early
abort, P2 cannot maximize his utility, as early abort of
P2 will terminate the protocol and in that case either no
one gets the correct output (UNN2 ) or both get the correct
output (UTT2 ). So P2 never achieves U
TN
2 by aborting
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early. However, it is P1 who can achieve U
TN
1 by aborting
early, as P1 always computes the output first followed by
P2. But in Theorem 12, we proved that provided R1
(Section II), (UTT1 − U
NN
1 ) + (U
TT
1 − U
NT
1 ) > (U
TN
1 −
UTT1 ), and 0 < γ <
3UTT
1
−UTN
1
−UNN
1
−UNT
1
UTN
1
+UTT
1
−UNN
1
−UNT
1
, P1 has no
incentive to abort early. Thus, we can say that for every
player Pw, w ∈ {1, 2}, uw(σ
′
w ,
−→σ −w) < uw(−→σ ) holds and
hence no one deviates from the suggested strategy.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In 1997, Lo [7] showed the impossibility of secure two-
party quantum computation of certain functions, when
one of the parties is malicious. In this direction, we ob-
tain a positive result for two types of functions. This does
not contradict with the generalized impossibility results
of [11] in broadcast channel model, since we show our
results in non-simultaneous channel model.
Further, for the first time, we introduce the idea of se-
cure two-party quantum computation with rational play-
ers. When one moves from the non-rational domain to
a rational one, the definition for fairness changes. Thus,
we modify the protocols to achieve fairness in rational
setting. In addition, we prove strict Nash equilibrium for
our proposed protocols in rational setting.
We have shown that secure two-party quantum compu-
tation is possible for any function without an embedded
XOR and for a particular function with an embedded
XOR. Thus, it remains an open question whether se-
cure two-party quantum computation is possible for any
function with an embedded XOR. Moreover, generaliza-
tion of the two-party protocols to n-party scenario would
be an interesting future work, particularly, in the non-
simultaneous channel model.
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